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Abstract 
Software development activities have been identified as a ‘window of opportunity’ for 
latecomer companies. Notwithstanding the growth of software development activities in the 
latecomers, there are single exceptional cases of companies that have successfully launched 
their own products in global software markets. This suggests that most of the latecomer 
software companies possess limited technological capabilities. This point has not been explored 
systematically in the literature so far, as the critical literature review reveals. This paper 
develops an approach for analysing technological capabilities in latecomer software industries. 
It outlines the specifics in analysing technological capability in latecomer software companies 
and makes an account of the array of technical and organisational capabilities associated with 
development of software technological capability. The research also looks at the diverse 
learning paths pursued by the latecomer companies in developing software activities. The study 
improves our understanding about the complexity in developing software industries in 
latecomer context, and the challenges the latecomer companies face in entering and competing 
in international markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades a group of studies has been emphasising that the information 
technologies (ITs) open opportunities for leapfrogging by latecomer companies, e.g. companies that 
originate and are embedded in a context that is not advanced (Soete 1985; Steinmueller 2001). It has 
been observed that the availability of skilful human capital creates a base for development of IT 
industries by latecomer countries. The software industry is, in principle, a low-capital but knowledge 
and skill-intensive industry, and the international market for software is big and growing (OECD 2004; 
Steinmueller 2004). Due to their higher contribution to economic growth the development of software 
and other high-tech industries has a potential to foster economic development in latecomers (Kuznets 
1957). For the above reasons, the discussion about developing indigenous software industries in the 
latecomer context has gained particular attention both in academic and policy literature for more than a 
decade (OECD 2004; Soete 1985; Steinmueller 2004; UNIDO 1988).  
A number of latecomers have attempted to develop software industries in the last decade. 
Different countries have followed different paths: development of the latecomer software industries in 
some latecomers is foreign-led, in some it is indigenous-based; some latecomer software industries are 
predominantly outsourcing-driven, some develop their own software activities; some latecomer 
software industries are export-driven, others remain domestic-oriented. Research on these 
developments is burgeoning following the recent outbursts of software development activities 
undertaken by latecomers (Arora et al. 2001; Arora and Gambardella 2005; Carmel 2003; Commander 
2005; Correa 1996; Heeks and Nicholson 2002; Tschang 2003). Studies focus on different variables 
reflecting differences in development of latecomer software industries in the range of products and 
services offered, market orientation, models of development (e.g. outsourcing-driven, development of 
own products and services, domestic-oriented vs. export-driven, etc.), revenue, growth, skills and 
abilities, etc. 
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Despite the extensive research on development of latecomer software industries, a major gap in 
our understanding exists. Notwithstanding the growth of software development activities in the 
latecomer context, few latecomers have managed to develop software products and services on their 
own and there are single exceptional cases of latecomer companies that have successfully launched 
own products and services in the global software markets (this point will be expanded in the discussion 
later on). This points out that latecomer software companies possess limited technological capabilities2. 
A recent research on latecomer software industries (Arora and Gambardella 2005) has pointed Israel 
and Ireland as examples of latecomers that have successfully entered the global software markets. 
However, this paper argues that despite being latecomers in entering the software industry, Israel and 
Ireland are advanced countries and thus the context is rather different from the context in the rest of the 
countries in Arora and Gambardella’s study, which are latecomers, in particular India, Brazil and 
China. Therefore it is meaningful and important to distinguish between advanced and latecomer 
context.   
Software production is by definition an innovation activity because it aims to produce new 
products or new ways of executing known tasks and functions (Torrisi 1998). To undertake software 
activities, companies need to possess capabilities to innovate. However, development of innovation 
capabilities is neither automatic nor certain. The literature on technological capability reveals that 
innovation capabilities are developed gradually and as a result of cumulative effort in passing through 
stages of gradually increasing technological sophistication (Figueiredo 2001). Applied to the software 
industry, this suggests that successful development of latecomer software activities requires 
                                                 
2 The fact that few latecomer companies succeeded to enter the global markets holds not only for software activities but also 
for the whole range of activities of new technology based firms, which illustrates the difficulties in building technological 
capabilities in new technological areas, and also influence of other entry factors and developments.  
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accumulation of technological capabilities for software production in the latecomers3. Therefore, the 
development of technological capability has to become a focal point both for companies engaged in 
software development activities and countries that are aiming to develop software industries to harness 
their potential in fostering economic development.  
Despite the extensive studies on latecomer software development activities the focus has 
seldom been placed explicitly and systematically on the issue of technological capability, as the critical 
literature review in this paper reveals. The limited number of studies that did so either have not been 
well-recognised or have some limitations. This paper disentangles the complexity in analysing 
technological capabilities in latecomer software companies and develops a framework for analysing 
capabilities in latecomer software companies with a special focus on technological capabilities.  
The paper is structured as follows. The following section 2 makes an overview of the existing 
literature on capabilities in latecomer software companies. Section 3 presents the proposed approach 
for analysing capabilities in latecomer software companies. Section 4 discusses diverse learning paths 
pursued by the latecomer companies in developing software activities. The final section 5 draws 
conclusions and outlines directions for further research. 
 
2. Existing literature on capabilities in latecomer software companies 
Schware (1989; 1992), Correa (1996), and Heeks and Nicholson (2002) have identified 
capabilities as critical factors enabling latecomer software companies to enter international markets. 
Some of the recent studies investigating the remarkable expansion of indigenous software development 
activities in the recent decade in a number of latecomer countries, like India, China and Brazil (see for 
                                                 
3 Studies about technological development in latecomers have repeatedly revealed that to be able to develop innovation 
capabilities the latecomers have to engage in a deliberate effort of technological capability building. In exceptional cases 
perhaps there are instances where a brilliant software solution can be developed by a ‘lone inventor’ but this is more likely 
to happen in advanced-context companies rather than latecomers. Studies in technological capabilities in latecomer software 
companies are limited to the moment and no such case has been identified yet.  
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example among many others, for all latecomer countries (Arora and Gambardella 2005; Carmel 2003; 
Commander 2005; Heeks and Nicholson 2002), for India (Arora et al. 2001; Athreye 2005; Desai 2005; 
Tschang 2001), for China (Saxenian and Quan 2005; Tschang and Xue 2005), for China vs. India 
(Contractor 2004; Tschang 2003), for Brazil (Behrens 2005; Botelho et al. 2005), also have mentioned 
capabilities as important drivers in the latecomer software industries development. However, most of 
these studies have focussed mainly on capabilities for software engineering without disentangling 
further the capability issue (the few exceptions are outlined below). 
A recent book by Arora and Gambardella (2005) analyses the underpinnings of the successful 
development of the software industries in several latecomer countries, among them India, China and 
Brazil. Alongside the specific developments in the individual countries, the study outlines the driving 
forces in the development of latecomer software industries. Capabilities emerge as important drivers 
underlying the success of these latecomers, as emphasised in the individual countries’ chapters (see 
(Athreye 2005), in particular; also (Botelho et al. 2005; Tschang and Xue 2005) and in the conclusions 
(Arora 2005). 
Despite the recognition and highlighting of their importance, the analysis provides neither a 
detailed nor a unified framework for analysing capabilities. In the individual chapters, the analysis of 
capabilities is combined with many other factors affecting industry development, and it is the sources 
of the incubation of capabilities that are the focal points of the analysis, rather than the capabilities 
(with the notable exception of Athreye’s contribution discussed below). A similar bias applies to the 
conclusions, which despite emphasising the importance of firms’ capabilities focus on the sources of 
firms’ capabilities rather than on capabilities themselves (Arora 2005). An explicit framework 
considering the specifics of technological capabilities building in the software industry and a 
connection with the literature in the field of technological developments in latecomer contexts are both 
absent from most of this study. 
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The exceptional nature of the study by Athreye (2005) deserves further attention. Although it 
does not provide an analytical framework nor does it explore the issue of technological capabilities 
building systematically, it does capture and portray the underlying idea of technological capabilities 
building. Exploring the development of the Indian software industry and the success factors 
contributing to its development, Athreye (2005) observes that the evolutionary development of 
capabilities underpins the Indian success. The study reveals that Indian companies had entered the 
international markets by providing basic programming skills, but over time they had developed 
capabilities for software process management, and in a few cases expertise in specialised domains. 
Athreye concludes by emphasising that the Indian model is a specific example; its success lies on the 
winning combination of developing different variants of the outsourced service model and evolving 
organisational capabilities for software process control and large-scale labour management (Athreye, 
2005: 36). In this sense, it can be perceived as a specific and exceptional case of development of a 
latecomer software industry.  
A range of paths, including outsourcing or developing own products and services for domestic 
or international markets, lay before latecomers, as already outlined. Athreye’s focus on outsourcing 
software products and services is just one of these paths.  In the case of outsourcing for multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), capabilities building would be heavily influenced by learning spillovers from 
MNEs. Different paths may well require and call upon different capabilities, which latecomer 
companies need to master. For example, outsourcing might require a set of skills, which are limited and 
significantly narrower than the set of skills required for companies to produce their own products and 
services. In this sense, the question about technological capabilities in the latecomer software 
companies still remains to a great extent open.  
Tschang (2001) provides a comprehensive software development model. He employs a 
typology of software development activities in the software development lifecycle that corresponds to 
 9
successive/different phases of the product lifecycle. The model outlines five major software 
development activities (below in italic type) paralleling four product development phases: 
1) new product development phase: 
1.1. conceptualisation: requirements analysis and design; 
1.2. (initial) software engineering: system analysis and software engineering, coding and 
programming, and testing; 
 2) installation phase:  
2.1. customisation;  
3) after sales phase:  
3.1. maintenance: operations and servicing; 
4) expiration phase: 
4. 1. product code updating/versioning/improvement.  
 
This is a valuable contribution, as it indicates the intersection between the software development 
lifecycle and the software product lifecycle. However, the model does not disentangle the issue of the 
technological sophistication required for software development activities it identifies nor does it 
investigate further the links of these activities to outsourcing, although it does identify differences in 
value added associated with different activities. Further, as the author acknowledges, further work is 
needed to break this model down into products and services, to determine different individual activities 
and skills needed for each type of activity, to distinguish different types of activities and firms, etc.  
 Tschang identifies a set of skills that the latecomer software companies need to develop 
(Tschang, 2001, pp. 19-20). They are classified in two major groups, product development skills and 
business development skills. Four categories of skills are identified in the product development skills: 
1) basic technical skills such as coding and programming languages; 2) system skills including project 
management, requirement analysis and systems analysis; 3) advanced or high technical skills including 
mathematical abilities and other fundamental (scientific) knowledge used in science and innovative 
product development; 4) innovative technical skills, which are creative, interdisciplinary and other 
skills needed for new product innovation. Under business development skills the author identifies two 
groups of skills: a) entrepreneurial skills including various management and networking skills, e.g. 
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sourcing of venture capital, managing a start up, forming alliances, etc. b) other conceptual skills 
including new products requirements analysis, knowledge of market and customer needs, and 
innovative and creative abilities.  
This is a valuable pioneering contribution with respect to analysing the capabilities that 
latecomer software companies need to muster. Nevertheless, it has two major limitations. First, despite 
the fact that the list of technical skills provides a relevant account of the technical capabilities involved 
in software production, it is not specific in identifying advanced and innovation capabilities.  
This paper adopts a different approach to identifying technical capabilities for software 
development as compared to Tschang (2001). The outlined array of technical capabilities reflects both 
the specifics of the software production, and the writings in technological capability building and 
business literature. In this sense, this study attempts to provide more practically-oriented advice and a 
better representation of the array of capabilities that latecomer software companies have to muster in 
order to develop technological capability. Second, the list of business skills provided by Tschang 
(2001) is generic and does not take into account the specificity of the technological development in the 
latecomer context and the specific organisational capabilities mentioned by several studies of latecomer 
company development. Furthermore, both in technical and organisational aspects Tschang (2001) 
outlines skills rather than capabilities and this by itself has conceptual limitations. To provide a better 
account and to deliver more valuable advice to latecomer software companies there is a need to 
elaborate the list both with respect to the technical and organisational capabilities, which is done in this 
research. 
In a later study (Tschang, 2003), the author focuses explicitly on capabilities of the latecomer 
software industries, looking at the case of the Indian and Chinese industry. He provides a list of items, 
namely individual technical skills, process maturity, management capability, technology, revenue 
model and product marketing capability. Despite being relevant and informative about the state of 
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development of a latecomer software industry this list looks at individual technical capabilities and at 
technology but does not disentangle the technical capabilities needed for software production (for 
example, capability for software engineering, design, etc.). It also ignores a substantial number of 
important capabilities, like for example capabilities to monitor technological development and identify 
potential niches, capabilities for strategic thinking, linkage capabilities, capabilities to establish 
dynamic organisational learning environment, etc. Further, from technological capability point of view 
this model provides a mix of capabilities (see above) and performance indicators (e.g. revenue model), 
without being exhaustive and without being clear how these are derived (although most of them are 
indeed relevant).  
In discussing the development of the Rumanian software industry Grundey and Heeks (1998) 
employ a theoretical framework based on the concept of technological capabilities and provides a 
taxonomy of the software technological capability. The study makes a valuable contribution, as it 
outlines different software production activities representing different phases in climbing the 
technological ladder to perform more sophisticated software production. It outlines activities 
underlying production and non-production software capabilities and it makes a comprehensive analysis 
of the process of moving up from the simple software production to software redesign and reaching 
skilled software production (Grundey and Heeks, 1998, p. 11). It classifies software activities in seven 
levels: level one and two include non-production activities, and level three onwards outline the 
production activities. Level three represents basic production of making copies of an existing software 
product; level four includes adaptation without production (e.g. create a situation-specific application 
from a package); level five is simple software production (e.g. creating a new set of interfaces for users, 
creating a program to move date between applications, creating a small utility program, modifying an 
existing program to meet user needs); level six involves software redesign (e.g. redesigning a program 
to meet local user needs, redesigning a program to meet regional/global user needs, and minor process 
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change (i.e. modifying the software production process); level seven, the highest level in the 
classification, represents the skilled software production: local product innovation (e.g. developing a 
new program to meet local user needs), international product innovation (i.e. developing a new 
program to meet regional/global user needs), major process change (i.e. redesigning the software 
production process), and process innovation (i.e. designing a completely new software production 
process). 
This model offers a comprehensive account of the wide variety of software activities. However, 
it includes both non-production and production activities. As the aim of the analyses of technological 
capabilities is to capture the level of technological sophistication of the software production in the 
companies, the analyses will be focussed on the levels five onwards in the classification. This part of 
the classification (e.g. level five to seven) is incorporated in the framework of this research. Further, 
despite being valuable and operational Grundey and Heek’s approach focuses in essence only on a 
range of software creating activities constituting what we can define as a ‘software development 
technological ladder’ but does not analyse the wide arrays of capabilities underlying these activities. In 
this sense, it does not explore the capabilities, which allow the companies to execute the outlined 
activities and to build technological capability. However, to have much practical value analyses should 
scrutinise the constituent capabilities underlying the development of technological capability. Further, 
in Grundey and Heek’s study the theoretical framework seems decoupled from the empirical section, 
which explores predominantly the institutional foundations (and their transformation) and briefly 
touches upon the development of software activities in the latecomer software industry in Romania, 
and thus does not provide a clear approach of how to apply the proposed framework. 
The critical review of the existing studies about capability building in latecomer software 
industries pinpoints a major gap in our understanding about capability building in the latecomer 
software industries. The predominant part of the studies do not investigate the capability issue in the 
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light of technological capability building. The limited number of studies that have placed the analysis 
within the framework of technological capability building or have explicitly focussed on investigating 
capabilities in the latecomer software industries have limitations, which have been discussed above.  
This paper investigates capabilities with a special focus on technological capability. In the 
following section it discusses the specifics in analysing technological capability in latecomer software 
industries, followed by a section in which it analyses a wide array of technical and organisational 
capabilities associated with development of technological capability in latecomer software companies. 
 
3. Investigating technological capabilities in latecomer software companies: a proposed 
framework 
To have the capacity to investigate the software technological capability the analysis has to 
incorporate the main ideas in the field of technological capability building4. The framework has to 
investigate both the level of technological sophistication of innovation capabilities, which the 
latecomer companies have managed to develop, and the underlying constituent capabilities. It also has 
to take into account the specifics of technological development in the latecomer context and the 
specifics in analysing the development of the latecomer software development activities. Further, it has 
to scrutinise the learning efforts and the upgrading trajectories they unfold. Combining all these aspects 
                                                 
4 The current enquiry adopts the main insights advanced by the literature on technological capability building. Based on the 
main propositions in the field and the critical review of the literature, the requirements for a framework of capabilities 
building are that it needs to consider that: 1) technological development in latecomer has its specifics, which has to be taken 
into account; 2) every sector reveals sector-specific features and trajectories of technological development, which have to be 
taken into consideration; 3) technological capability comprises a wide array of capabilities; 4) innovation capabilities 
develop gradually by passing through subsequent stages of increase in technological sophistication of the accumulated 
capabilities; 5) analyses have to investigate both the level of technological sophistication of the routine and innovation 
capabilities, which the latecomer companies have managed to develop, and the underlying constituent capabilities; 6) 
alongside technical capabilities the technological capability includes capabilities that are organisational not technical in 
nature; 7) the organisational capabilities shapes the dynamics of the learning and development of technological capability; 
8) technological capability building reveals systemic features; interdependencies occur among the development of the 
constituencies; 9) learning and technological capability building is a process of passing through different stages of 
technological maturity, i.e. upgrading; 10) the learning efforts in the company are the major driver for technological 
upgrade; studies have to scrutinise the company-specific learning mechanisms and capabilities that drive the technological 
upgrade.  
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the analysis will have the capacity to grasp the complexity in developing latecomer software industries 
and to deliver much practical value.  
This study develops a framework for analysing technological capabilities in latecomer software 
industries by taking all the above points into account. It takes into account the contributions of the 
previous studies about capabilities in latecomer software industries (Athreye 2005; Grundey and Heeks 
1998; Tschang 2001; 2003). Studies have highlighted that organisational settings in the companies 
shape learning and development of technological capability (Kim 1997; Kim and Nelson 2000; 
Leonard 1995; Marcelle 2004). Therefore it is important for the latecomers to develop enabling 
organisational arrangements. The studies have stressed various organisational aspects and this research 
combines them to produce a list of organisational capabilities that the latecomers should muster. An 
important conceptual issue is still open in the literature and it concerns the interface between 
organisational capabilities and the technological capability. Another paper (Rousseva 2008b) makes a 
critical enquiry in that direction. For the purpose of this paper we will accept that organisational 
underpinnings are critical drivers shaping the development of technological capabilities. 
The framework first disentangles the specifics in analysing technological capabilities in 
latecomer software industries. Following that the framework attempts to identify the major capabilities, 
which the latecomer software companies have to muster to achieve the highest level of technological 
capability. Then it discusses the diverse learning paths pursued by the latecomer companies in 
developing software activities. 
Exploring the technological capabilities in latecomer software industries presents a challenge. 
So far, studies analysing the process of technological capabilities have been predominantly focused on 
the industrial sector, studying development of the electronics industry (Gee and Kuo 1998; Hobday 
1995; Kim 1997; Mytelka and Ernst 1998), textiles (Gee and Kuo 1998; Lall 1987), pulp and paper 
industry (Figueiredo 2001), steel industry (Dutrenit 2000; Lall 1987), telecommunications (Marcelle 
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2004), and so forth. 
As the predominant part of the studies have been directed at exploring technological capabilities 
in industrial sectors, the analytical framework developed in the field so far reflects the specifics of the 
industrial sector as contrasted with the service sector and, additionally, specific features of industrial 
activities such as photolithography in the context of electronic integrated circuits. A study investigating 
technological capabilities in latecomer software industries needs to take into account the specifics of 
the software industry, which are discussed below. 
 
 
3.1. Specifics in analysing technological capabilities in latecomer software industries  
 
This research identifies three major features, which have to be considered in analysing 
latecomer software development activities.  
First, concerning the degree of innovativeness inbuilt in software technological capability. As 
noted earlier software production in inherently an innovation activity (Torrisi 1998). Therefore, when 
analysing the technological capabilities in the software industry, the distinction between production 
capabilities and innovation capabilities becomes blurred. To produce software solutions latecomer 
companies must possess some capabilities to innovate.  
In order to assess the abilities of the latecomer companies to innovate the analyses should take 
into account that the degree of innovativeness in the latecomers’ software production may vary and 
therefore should scrutinise the degree of innovativeness inbuilt in the products and services offered by 
the latecomer companies. The significance of novelty, which governs the extent of innovation 
capability needed, varies among different software projects. This point is particularly important in 
studying the latecomer software industry. It requires the research to disentangle the software innovation 
process and to classify the software production in terms of its degree of innovativeness.  
Before disentangling the degree of innovativeness in the software production, it is worth 
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clarifying our treatment of innovativeness. Usually the innovativeness is measured with a reference to 
the novelty to the world market. Following this logic, only products that are successful in the 
international markets involve high degree of innovativeness. However, innovativeness is also 
associated with the commercial value it produces. It is usually held that commercialisation in the 
international markets has a potential to reap higher profits than commercialisation in the domestic 
market. But this may not always hold. For example, a company may attain higher commercial value by 
creating an innovative product meeting the needs of a large number of customers in the domestic 
market (for example payroll and tax record keeping system reflecting the local regulations) in 
comparison with a company that develops a niche product for a limited number of customers in the 
international markets. Bearing this duality in mind we will treat innovativeness as novelty to the world, 
as the aim of the analyses of technological capability is to assess the technological sophistication, 
which the latecomer companies have achieved. 
Different types of software production activities involve different level of innovative efforts and 
respectively result in software products and services with different degree of innovativeness inbuilt in 
them. Software services like re-coding legacy applications into more modern computer languages, data 
migration, or resolving specific incompatibilities between similar systems, and so forth, involve a 
relatively small innovative component. On the other hand, producing sophisticated software customised 
services and software packages usually involve higher degree of innovativeness. For example, to 
successfully launch an ERP or CRM system, or e-commerce solution, a latecomer software company 
needs to deploy sophisticated knowledge and expertise, and to offer a solution, which is comparable to 
the frontier technological developments in that particular domain.  
In analysing the software activities undertaken by the latecomer companies it is important to 
scrutinise the degree of innovativeness inbuilt in them and the degree of sophistication of innovation 
capabilities deployed. When studying the degree of innovative efforts associated with producing 
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particular software products or services, it is meaningful to distinguish between minor, moderate and 
major innovation, which are respectively associated with capabilities for minor, moderate and major 
innovation. This can be viewed as a ‘software development technological ladder’. 
This distinction follows the classification of software technological capability developed by 
Grundey and Heeks (1998) and corresponds to the activities classified in level five to level seven in 
their classification. Simple software production, i.e. software activities like creating new set of 
interfaces, data migration, creating small utility program and/or modifying an existing program to meet 
user needs involve a small innovative component and signify existence of capabilities for minor 
innovation. Software redesign activities like redesigning a program to meet local user needs and 
redesigning a program to meet regional/global user needs (i.e. customisation and/or localisation), and 
minor process change (i.e modifying the software production process) indicate capabilities for 
moderate innovation. Skilled software production activities like local product innovation (i.e. 
developing a new program to meet local user needs), international product innovation (i.e. developing a 
new program to meet regional/global user needs), major process change (i.e. redesigning the software 
production process), and process innovation (i.e. designing a completely new software production 
process) suggest capabilities for major innovation. 
The proportion of activities like re-coding, data migration, resolving incompatibility, and so 
forth, can be expected to account for a significant share in the software services offered by latecomer 
companies. On the other hand, the presence of major innovative activities, like creation of packages or 
sophisticated customised services, despite their small share in latecomer software developments, 
signals the existence of potentially significant innovation capabilities in the latecomers. For example, if 
many latecomer software development activities are directed at offering services in the domestic 
markets and there is also a growing share of performing outsourcing services for international markets, 
this would indicate capabilities for minor and eventually moderate innovation; India has specialised in 
 18
offering software services in the international markets, and if we apply the classification of the degree 
of innovativeness to the range of software development activities which the Indian software companies 
offer according to the literature (Arora et al. 2001; Athreye 2005; Desai 2005) it will reveal the 
existence of capabilities for minor, moderate innovation and in some though a limited number of cases 
capabilities for major innovation. China and Brazil have developed software products and services for 
the domestic markets (Behrens 2005; Botelho et al. 2005; Saxenian and Quan 2005; Tschang and Xue 
2005), which suggest capabilities for moderate and major innovation. The above  is a general overview 
of the accumulated technological capabilities in latecomer software industries based on the existing 
studies but further in-depth, case study and comparison-based analyses are needed to reveal the 
achievements and problems in development of technological capabilities. These should be done by 
comparing different companies in one country and comparing companies in different countries to 
capture both company- and context-specific issues. 
Second, reflecting the breadth of capabilities. The discussion about the degree of innovativeness 
inbuilt in software technological capability in the previous point reflects also on the breadth of the 
technological capability. Higher technological sophistication usually entails deeper (i.e. more 
sophisticated) capabilities and a wider range of (i.e. broader) capabilities. This illustrates the idea that 
technological capabilities develop by deepening and broadening of capabilities and involve moving 
upwards the technological ladder (Hobday 1995). It reveals that capabilities develop in a sequential 
manner and this makes it important for studies to analyse that sequencing and the development of a 
deeper and broader set of capabilities. 
Provided that the nature of innovation is similar across sectors, then the capabilities literature 
suggests that major innovation require execution of a greater variety and also more complex software 
development activities as compared to capabilities for moderate and minor innovation. For example, 
creating a product innovation involves broader and far more complex capabilities than the software 
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redesign or the simple software production. Similarly, capabilities for moderate innovation entail 
bigger variety and more complex software activities as compared to capabilities for minor innovation. 
Thus for example, software redesign (e.g. redesigning a program to meet local or global user needs or 
minor process change) require greater capabilities than the simple software production of creating new 
interfaces, small utility program or program for data migration, modifying existing program, etc. 
Therefore, higher degree of innovativeness entails broader and more complex capabilities, i.e. the 
breadth of capabilities increases with the increase in the innovativeness.  
High technological sophistication entails sophisticated capabilities. The following section in 
this paper explores a wide variety of capabilities, which the latecomer software companies need to 
muster to reach the highest level of technological maturity, which is to launch own products in the 
international markets5. In this sense it attempts to outline the major capabilities, which the latecomer 
software companies have to muster to achieve the highest level of technological capability. Therefore, 
the framework portrays the major capabilities involved in the software development technological 
ladder, from minor innovation to major innovation but further empirical analyses have to be conducted 
to reveal the links between the degree of innovativeness and the underlying constituent capabilities. It 
is worth underlying that development of this framework for analysing technological capabilities in 
latecomer software companies is derived from premise-based logic and analogy, but this needs to be 
tested in a specific contexts to explore the links between the degree of innovativeness and the 
underlying constituent capabilities, and to see whether it holds true for the industry in every 
developmental context. 
In identifying the wide arrays of capabilities, which the latecomer software companies need to 
                                                 
5 Strictly speaking the highest level of technological maturity is the process innovation, e.g. designing a completely new 
software production process. However, reaching this level is a daunting task even for advanced-context companies; for 
latecomers is almost unattainable. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis and to make the study more operational it can 
be assumed that the highest level of technological maturity, which the latecomer software companies might be aiming to 
achieve is the launching of their own products or services in the international markets.  
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build the study draws on insights from studies on software engineering, development of latecomer 
software industries, technological capability building literature, etc.  
There is one other aspect worth mentioning in discussing the level of technological 
sophistication of software production and the sophistication of the underlying capabilities. There might 
be cases where ‘low complexity’ innovation represents a major innovation. For example, development 
of the ‘bubble sort,’ a relatively early and rather problematic ‘innovation’ widely used in teaching 
computer science, represent a ‘low complexity’ innovation which is in essence a ‘major innovation’ 
because it is a conceptual breakthrough with regard to existing state of the art. In the context of 
assessing technological capabilities in latecomer software companies a conceptual breakthrough (e.g. 
algorithmic invention) by itself does not constitute an innovation because it is not embedded in a 
commercial product. Nevertheless, any presence of technical expertise of that kind signals the existence 
of high level of technical potential that if harnessed successfully can generate innovative software 
products and services. 
Third, in a globally competitive context, the variation in technological sophistication of 
software development activities and the implications for the organisation of software development is 
relevant. Software production is carried out in a cycle of software development activities, as described 
by software engineering literature, and involves a range of software development activities. It is 
appealing to explore further two issues: the variation in technological sophistication of software 
development activities and the implications for the organisation of software development.  
The activities involved in software development lifecycle vary in terms of their degree of 
technological sophistication. Some activities like for example analysis of customer needs, system 
analysis, design, etc. require sophisticated technological knowledge, while others like coding, testing, 
maintenance are less sophisticated. 
The table 1. in the Appendix below classifies major types of software development activities in 
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the software lifecycle according to their technological sophistication.  
Software development activities along the lifecycle can be partitioned and split into different 
software projects to be executed by different software development teams. Sophisticated software 
development activities, like requirements analysis and design, can be executed by advanced-context 
companies, while less sophisticated software development activities like coding, testing and 
maintenance can be outsourced to latecomer companies to leverage on cost advantage in the 
latecomers. Recent years saw an upsurge in the outsourcing of software development activities to the 
latecomer companies. The increasing acceptance of this new business model of organisation of 
software development makes relevant the examining of its complexity (e.g. technological 
sophistication of the outsourced activities, etc.) and its prevalence. This is a particularly important point 
when analysing development of latecomer software activities.  
A number of latecomers have developed outsourcing-driven software development activities. 
The question which arises is what kind of software development activities these involve, whether they 
involve only software development activities with lower technological sophistication or they also 
include other more sophisticated software development activities. For example, the predominant part of 
software development activities outsourced to latecomer companies might involve coding, testing and 
redesign because requirements for these activities can be concisely and precisely described and 
incorporated into business contracts. At the same time, studies have revealed that the Indian companies 
have managed to move up the technological ladder and increase the technological sophistication of 
their production by shifting from coding and testing to domain expertise (Athreye, 2005). Therefore, in 
analysing the development of latecomer software industries, studies need to investigate both the range 
and the type of software development activities undertaken by the latecomers and to scrutinise their 
technological sophistication.  
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3.2. Disentangling the constituent technical and organisational capabilities  
To be able to produce software products and launch them successfully in the international 
markets, a latecomer company needs to develop an array of capabilities. Table 2 in the Appendix 
summarises the technical and organisational capabilities underpinning the accumulation of 
technological capability, which the latecomer software companies need to develop. The subsequent 
sub-sections examine the two sets of capabilities, technical and organisational, and within these sub-
sections each of the listed capabilities is briefly discussed.   
 
3.2.1. Technical capabilities in latecomer software companies 
 A number of technical capabilities are involved in developing software technological 
capability, many of which have been identified by existing studies on capability development in 
latecomer software industries and in the software engineering and business literature. 
Technical capabilities can be divided in basic, intermediate and advanced categories. The 
underlying idea behind this categorisation is the existence of thresholds in knowledge accumulation 
and capability development. This point is particularly important for the latecomer software companies, 
as they may face difficulties in accumulating not only advanced capabilities, but also intermediate and 
even basic capabilities, and this will affect directly their possibilities to develop indigenous software 
activities on their own and sustain them over time without being trapped in low and narrow capability 
trap.  
  
Basic technical capabilities 
The capabilities, which constitute the minimal core technical capabilities, which any software 
company needs to possess in order to undertake software development activities, are classified as basic 
technical capabilities. The first basic technical capability, the capability for software programming, is 
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associated with the phase of actual writing of the software. Knowledge about software programming 
languages and techniques, and platforms creates the base for creating software code. To develop 
mastery, however, latecomers need to develop deep understanding about software programming. They 
need to build expertise about algorithms, software programming languages, and so forth. Building 
expertise in scripting languages for WWW data (for example Java, XML, JavaScript, HTML, CSS, 
XSL, XSLT, C++, C and Object-C) requires developing understanding about their comparative utility 
for specific application contexts. Further, mastering one of these languages requires developing deeper 
understanding about it. For example, to develop excellent programming skills the latecomers need not 
only to learn the syntax of the Java programming language, but also object-oriented programming with 
the Java programming language; creating graphical user interfaces (GUI), exceptions, file input/output 
(I/O), threads and networking.  
The second basic capability for software development is testing and high quality assurance. The 
latecomer companies need to deliver high quality products and services, if they are to be successful. To 
produce high quality products and services latecomers need to build capabilities for software quality 
assurance in which reliability is the central issue. Developing capabilities for software quality 
assurance is a focus of attention among practitioners and academics, and has resulted in creation of 
quality assurance guidelines, reflected both in ISO certification scheme and the Capability Maturity 
Model Integration (CMMI) assessment scheme. Whether certified under one of these schemes, or not, 
latecomer software companies need to apply software quality assurance techniques to ensure the 
quality and reliability of the software they deliver. Rigorous testing, de-bugging and defect elimination 
are critical steps in that direction.  
The basic technical capabilities are relatively easy to obtain as they contain high codified 
element and most of latecomer companies entering the software development activities pass 
successfully this stage. The basic technical capabilities alone are insufficient for a software company to 
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establish itself, and they need to be augmented further with intermediate technical capabilities.  
 
Intermediate technical capabilities  
The intermediate technical capabilities and the capabilities for project and software process 
management in particular, represent an important threshold in capability development for the 
latecomers to be able to adequately perform technical tasks and to become competitive. Development 
of the intermediate capabilities enables the latecomer companies to manage systematically the software 
development activities and thus lays foundations for accumulation of further more advanced expertise. 
Among the most important intermediate capabilities are the capabilities for project 
management. Every company has to develop abilities to effectively organise and manage its projects. 
Companies have to develop skills to split the software development activities in a project into different 
tasks and to gather teams to execute them. Good project management requires gathering teams with 
adequate expertise and ensuring efficient workflow. Project management becomes more complex 
nowadays due to the increasing complexity in the organisation of the software development. As already 
mentioned, the modern model of organisation, where software development is distributed among 
several firms, some of which latecomers, is becoming more common at present. This new trend makes 
project management capabilities critical for the latecomers. Project management consists of both 
technical and organisational aspects. The organisational aspect will be discussed in the following 
section, which makes an overview of the organisational capabilities.  
Apart from project management capabilities, the latecomer software companies have to develop 
capabilities for software process control, which are identified as the second intermediate technical 
capabilities. Every software company should tailor its software production to achieve efficiency gains. 
Academics and practitioners have dedicated considerable efforts in developing models for assessing the 
effectiveness of the software production processes, and Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) 
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and ISO are the most influential among them. To achieve efficiency gains a software producing 
company should go beyond the stage of craft and ad-hoc software production and should make 
deliberate efforts to streamline its production process.  
Although there is a high intangible component associated with it, software production permits 
measurability and tailoring, and achieving better efficiency. During testing and de-bugging phase 
mistakes should be reported and instructions put in place to ensure that these are avoided in future. This 
suggests that software companies have to monitor constantly their production activities and evaluate 
their efficiency. Further, the software code written for one project can be stored for eventual future use.  
Software production allows for re-usability of the software code, which creates opportunities 
for considerable efficiency gains. Developing capabilities for software process control is not automatic 
in general and is far from straightforward for latecomer companies. Therefore, latecomer software 
companies have to put deliberate efforts to develop capabilities to control and manage their software 
production processes. An increasing number of latecomer software companies are undergoing ISO and 
CMMI certification to reveal their technological potential. Studies (Arora et al. 2001; Athreye 2005) 
have emphasised that certification has been extensively used by the Indian companies to strengthen 
their competitive stand. Nevertheless, certifying and developing capabilities in project and software 
process management remains a challenging task for latecomers.  
The next (optional) intermediate capabilities are the capabilities for operating in various 
environments. The latecomer software companies may need also to build capabilities in various 
operating environments, to be able to respond to various clients’ needs and requirements. Although 
Windows operating system is the dominant computer platform, other operating systems like Linux, 
Unix and Mac are also used. Therefore, the latecomer software companies need to be aware that opting 
for learning software design, programming and networking only on the dominant platform instead of 
building expertise in all existing platforms may involve costs or lost business. This type of business 
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loss is not necessarily fatal and can be perceived as an incentive for companies to broaden their 
expertise by learning to undertake software activities also in other platforms, to be able to better 
respond to customers’ requirements. Development of capabilities for operating in LINUX environment 
is with increasing importance, as the free libre and open standard software (FLOSS) solutions are 
becoming more popular recently. Alongside some companies, FLOSS have been adopted by some 
public administrations and public education systems, which signals a growing presence of FLOSS, 
which may open new opportunities for latecomer software companies.   
Creating a modern software product or service very often requires capabilities for networking 
applications and these are identified as the next (optional) intermediate capabilities. The networking 
applications include any kind of software solution, which operates in a network environment. Wide 
ranges of software solutions nowadays involve networking. For example, the information system in a 
company represents a network (that is intranet). Simultaneously, the companies are using software 
solutions operating in Internet (that is web-based solutions), while executing their every day operations 
for document sharing, coordination, communication, payment, and so forth. Therefore, the software 
company, which develops a new software solution for a client, needs to take into account the access by 
multiple users to the network resources such as files and to ensure security over the access as well as 
dealing with the need for ‘file locking’ to prevent simultaneous editing by different users of the same 
data. To be able to develop reliable networking applications the latecomer software companies need to 
build expertise in security engineering. They need to develop understanding about the network 
operating systems, security protocols, techniques for specifying and implementing a security policy, 
and so forth. This may present a cumbersome task for the latecomers, as network security is among the 
most dynamic fields, which has been rapidly developing recently. 
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Advanced technical capabilities 
The last threshold in development of capabilities for software production involves development 
of advanced capabilities. Basic and intermediate capabilities provide a base for undertaking software 
development activities, but development of advanced capabilities reveals a qualitatively different stage 
in capability development, as it involves a mastery over capabilities with high technological 
sophistication. 
The first advanced capability is the capability for software design. It is associated with the 
phase of inception of software development, when software companies need to design how the 
software will look and perform based on clients’ requirements. Software design is sophisticated 
software activity involving a number of interrelated steps of analysing the software domain, identifying 
the software specifications, analysing thoroughly customers’ needs, designing the software 
architecture, system analysis, etc. Software design activities are complex, as they involve a number of 
sophisticated activities and determine the software characteristics. Due to their complex nature 
capabilities for software design are difficult to muster, as it might be a daunting task for latecomer 
software companies to develop an in-depth expertise in all these areas.  
It is also vital for latecomers to establish specialised expertise and depth of understanding in a 
particular domain, which may be identified as the second advanced technical capability.  Developing a 
deep understanding and expertise about frontier technologies is particularly challenging for latecomer 
companies as they are embedded in a latecomer context, and therefore, developing expertise by 
focussing on a particular domain appears to be a more realistic strategy for the latecomer companies to 
enable their attempts for technological upgrading. For instance, good knowledge and understanding of 
finance and banking system is required, if a software company is to create finance or banking software 
solution. The task becomes even more daunting, if a latecomer company seeks to develop finance or 
banking solution for international markets, where operations are far more complex and sophisticated; 
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and therefore, the latecomer company needs to put deliberate efforts to develop deeper understanding 
about its specifics.  
A second example is the development of ERP systems. To be able to build an ERP system, a 
latecomer software company needs to develop an understanding about not only the structure of the ERP 
systems but also knowledge and understanding of corporate practices in a particular market and a 
particular industry in which the system is to be employed. Some though a limited number of latecomer 
companies have already managed to establish domain expertise, like for example Brazilian and Indian 
companies have developed expertise in the financial domain (Athreye 2005; Botelho et al. 2005).   
The capability to diversify the products and services (the third advanced technical capability) is 
optional and perhaps rather difficult to achieve by latecomer software companies. The software 
companies are specialised suppliers according to Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy, that is companies providing 
specialised products. Being specialised suppliers does not preclude diversification. Companies can 
diversify their products and services within their specialised niche. Diversifying the range of products 
and services, which a company offers, creates an opportunity for companies to reap greater benefit 
from their knowledge base by applying it in different contexts. Once the latecomer companies have 
developed expertise in a particular area, they may decide to broaden the range of products and services 
they offer, based on the experience and knowledge they have, or market opportunities they perceive. 
The degree of diversification may vary. Diversifying by introducing new products or services, which 
require the latecomer company to enter a new domain, which is completely separate from the domain 
in which the company has accumulated expertise so far is associated with high risk for any company, 
especially latecomers. On the other hand, diversifying by introducing new products or services, which 
are close to the existing range, and to the already accumulated expertise in a particular field, is far less 
risky endeavour. For example, developing a modular web-based platform for automated billing, 
invoicing and customer management for the one spectrum of services, for example Voice-over-IP 
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involves lower technological efforts and leads to lower degree of diversification in a company which 
has previously developed a modular web-based platform for automated billing, invoicing and customer 
managements for a spectrum of services like Internet, triple play, WiMAX and regular voice 
communication services. Introducing systems able to address all of these applications will require 
significantly higher technological efforts and will result in a higher degree of diversification for a 
company than simply developing an automated billing application for one application. Such 
diversification may, however, be necessary to provide a competitive offering to those being offered by 
rivals. This sort of diversification is a difficult task for latecomers, given that they need to maintain the 
depth of expertise in a particular domain and, at the same time, to broaden the range of the products 
and services within that domain and, perhaps, also to broaden the expertise in different domains.  
However, a strategy of diversification is difficult to achieve even by an advanced company and 
therefore a strategy for specialisation remains a more realistic strategy for latecomers. It remains hard 
for latecomer companies to succeed in diversification, due to the limited access to frontier 
technological knowledge and knowledge of the application domain in other countries they have, being 
embedded in a latecomer environment. In fact, capabilities for diversification are the only among the 
outlined ones which remain as an optional theoretical but a bit difficult to defend as a realistic and 
feasible proposal for latecomer software companies. On the other hand, it depends pretty much on the 
nature and degree of diversification. For example, many latecomer companies operating only in 
domestic markets diversify the range of activities they offer. For example, it is common for latecomer 
software companies developing software services and solutions for domestic markets to offer also 
system integration and even telecommunication services. Therefore, the decision of whether and in 
what direction to diversify remains in the discretion of the individual company based on its expertise, 
technological and market positions, and perceived opportunities. 
Capabilities to monitor technical change and to identify niches for potential developments are 
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identified as the fourth and last advanced technical capabilities. They draw heavily on the accumulation 
of technical expertise and also require some marketing expertise. To become competitive and sustain 
its competitive position any company (and particularly a company in a high-tech sector) needs to keep 
abreast with the new technological developments. By deepening their technological expertise and 
strengthening the sophistication of their technological capabilities over time the latecomer companies 
should eventually reach a point of being capable of identifying niches for potential new developments 
and developing them on their own. To achieve that, the companies need to stretch their capabilities 
beyond mere monitoring of technological development. They need to develop in-depth knowledge and 
understanding about technological development to be able to identify potential niches for new 
developments, assess their technological and market viability, and develop them on their own. Building 
the necessary technical and organisational expertise to master the existing frontier technological 
developments remains a challenge to the latecomers, and some of them may remain far behind in 
managing the existing frontier developments. Developing capabilities to identify potential niches for 
new developments require further deliberate, focused and persistent efforts to expand the technical 
expertise and organisational abilities, to reach a level of technological mastery enabling companies to 
foresee trends of development and to identify niches for potential new applications. Being embedded in 
a context, which does not expose them to the latest technological developments, and being away from 
lead users, latecomers may find this to be a particularly difficult task. 
 
3.2.2. Organisational capabilities  
Recent studies in technological capability building (Kim 1997; Leonard 1995; Marcelle 2004) 
have disentangled the interface between the organisational settings and the accumulation of 
technological capabilities. The results have highlighted that the organisational settings in the company 
shape the development of technological capability and therefore further research has to scrutinise the 
organisational capabilities in the latecomers. Following the findings of these recent studies the 
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proposed approach outlines a set of organisational capabilities that have been repeatedly cited as 
underpinning the development of technological capability and therefore are to be developed by the 
latecomer companies. This approach has some idiosyncratic elements; although it uses ideas from 
management literature, it adapts them to the specifics of the latecomer context. It produces a list of 
organisational capabilities that in some cases may seem simple or obvious from a standpoint of an 
advanced-context company but for a latecomer company they not be seen as needed or, even if 
perceived as important, may be difficult to develop, as studies have repeatedly revealed (Ernst et al. 
1998; Kim 1997; Leonard 1995; Marcelle 2004).  
The approach disentangles the organisational capabilities reaching a high level of 
disaggregation. Further, this approach places emphasis even on basic organisational capabilities, like 
organising, communication and control, as the latecomer companies may lack or possess limited 
capacity even in such basic management capabilities. Although the organisational capabilities are 
applied to the case of the software industry, they can be easily adapted to any other latecomer 
industries. 
The approach offered here employs six categories of organisational capabilities (table 2 in the 
Appendix). 
The first of the organisational capabilities, the ability to establish organisational culture 
facilitating learning, can be considered as the most fundamental capability, as it underlies the 
development of all technical and organisational capabilities. Studies have repeatedly revealed that 
development of technological capability is conditioned by the existence of organisational culture 
facilitating learning in the latecomers (Kim 1997; Marcelle 2004). The ability to learn is shaped by 
company’s attitude towards new ideas, and the openness, flexibility and aptitude to accommodate them. 
It requires establishment of an interactive and open environment in the organisation, which makes it 
possible to be receptive to new ideas and new developments. The latecomer companies therefore need 
to establish an environment for accumulation of information, exchange of ideas, and knowledge 
generation and re-combination.  
To achieve this type of organisational culture, the whole organisation needs to be ‘tuned’ into a 
learning mode, which requires a degree of openness, exploration and adaptation. Supporting 
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organisational arrangements are to be put in place to create an open and flexible environment and to 
enable learning. The organisation should establish flexible structures allowing active information and 
communication exchange and generation of new ideas. Learning inevitably involves change. Adopting 
new ideas and developments often necessitates undergoing some sort of change. In this sense, abilities 
to learn are closely coupled with change management skills. Case studies of successful technological 
development often confirm that it was indeed the change management capabilities that underpin 
dynamic technological and organisational learning (Kim 1997; Marcelle 2004).  
The abilities to establish organisational culture facilitating learning constitute essential elements 
of the capabilities for effective management. The former have been outlined separately, as they 
represent the major driver of the process of technological capabilities building. The latter, the second of 
the organisational capabilities, is no less important. Every single aspect of the organisational 
functioning is affected and indeed shaped by the company’s management, which makes company’s 
management a critical factor. The company should be managed in a consistent way to achieve effective 
results. A step further from effective management, i.e. doing the right things, is to manage things 
efficiently, i.e. doing the things right. The latecomer companies should focus first on developing 
capabilities for effective management and later on embark on achieving efficiency gains.  
Organisational processes, like communication, decision-making, coordination, control, and so 
forth, are contingent on management decisions and reflect company’s strategy. Managerial decisions 
underlie the vision of what and where the organisation should be in the future and the strategy for 
pursuing it. To be effective, the management activities should encompass all levels and types of 
company’s activities to create a coherent working environment. A company with effective management 
involves its members in active communication with each other, participatory decision-making and 
well-coordinated activities; and team building and working in a team are essential elements in the 
organisational culture.  
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Essential organisational processes that must be managed effectively are the organisational 
design, coordination, communication, organisational integration, change management, etc. For the 
latecomer companies it may well be a difficult task to ensure the effective functioning of all of these 
organisational processes, as it requires elaborate organisational skills that they may not possess. For 
example, the latecomers may find difficulties in setting an organisational design that is most suitable 
for the task executed by the company. They also may face difficulties in arranging effective 
coordination across the organisational units and functions. Similarly, rigid communication structures 
and arrangements may be in place and the latecomers may be unable to dismantle them, which in result 
will impede the exchange of information and knowledge in the organisation and will affect the upgrade 
process. Organisational integration is also a complex task, which requires achieving integration among 
all organisational functions to accrue synergy effects, which may be beyond the capacities of some 
latecomer companies.  
Project management is an essential element in effective management. Project management 
involves identifying the activities to be undertaken within the project, setting deadlines and creating 
workflow plans, assigning responsibilities, monitoring the work progress and delivering quality 
outcomes within the deadlines. To take best advantage of market opportunities, latecomers should 
develop project management skills to manage both small and large-scale projects. Managing large-
scale projects poses greater challenges for latecomers. The large-scale projects may require resources 
well beyond those under the company’s control, as normally the latecomer companies are small-scale 
and possess limited resources and sometimes even limited expertise. If a latecomer company faces the 
opportunity of executing a large-scale project, it has to be able to mobilise the necessary human 
resources and the additional expertise it may need. It also has to be able to coordinate the proliferation 
of tasks that large-scale projects produce, a process different in degree if not in type from the process of 
managing smaller-scale projects. Large projects require the efficient location of knowledge and other 
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necessary resources as well as rapid response and excellence in coordination. Developing capabilities 
to manage both small and large projects appears one of the critical drivers underlining the success of 
the Indian software industry (Athreye 2005). Being capable of managing large projects the latecomers 
are in a possession of a large pool of resources, which they are able to deploy and utilise. When these 
are coupled with relevant technical expertise and other organisational skills, the latecomer software 
companies will be in a position to compete. 
Abilities for prompt delivery are also important elements in effective management capabilities. 
Meeting deadlines is crucial, as failure to do so result in increasing project costs and customer 
dissatisfaction. Delivery on time is crucially important in international markets. In latecomer countries, 
where the market power of suppliers may be high or where there are high transactions costs of 
changing suppliers, clients might be more lenient toward delays and this creates a challenge for 
latecomer companies to learn to execute projects meeting strictly the deadlines. To be able to do that, 
they need to develop abilities and skills for project management, tracking the work progress throughout 
the project, clarifying project requirements at the very beginning, effective communication between 
parties throughout the project, and so forth.  
Establishing effective management practices can appear a difficult task for any company, but it 
is particularly difficult for latecomers, due to their limited business experience. Latecomers need to 
develop new skills but they also may need to discard existing ineffective management practices. All 
these require effective change management capabilities. Change management activities affect 
company’s activities in all levels: tasks performed by individuals, various organisational processes 
(communication, decision making, coordination, control, and so forth), overall strategic vision, 
organisational culture, and so forth. In order to perform effective change management the organisations 
need to constantly monitor their activities and the signals by the external environment, and to undertake 
re-adjustments in the organisation. All above illustrates the complexity, which the latecomers face in 
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developing effective management abilities, enabling them to master the organisational and technical 
dynamics underpinning the development of new technologies.  
In addition to the above capabilities a third category of capabilities appears to be important - the 
learning ability of the company. Alongside the establishment of organisational culture facilitating 
learning as the most fundamental organisational capability, it is also important how the learning effort 
operates. Studies have emphasised that alongside placing deliberate efforts to upgrade, the latecomer 
companies need to develop capabilities for expeditious (Kim 1997) and integrative learning (Marcelle 
2004) to achieve successful technological upgrade. Learning is the major driving force in the process of 
upgrade but the appropriate learning effort does not emerge automatically. Studies have emphasised 
that in order to enhance the accumulation of technological capability the learning effort should be 
expeditious and integrative rather than isolated and effortless (Kim 1997; Marcelle 2004). The 
latecomers should develop capabilities to learn in an expeditious manner, which may involve crisis 
construction to rapidly acquire and absorb and re-combine new knowledge and to unlearn deficient 
elements. Only focussed, purposeful and expeditious learning effort can generate the required dynamics 
for successful and swift technological upgrade. In addition to this, to successfully upgrade the 
latecomer companies need to tap a variety of sources of information and knowledge. Information and 
knowledge from the global innovation system as well as information from suppliers and/or users should 
be closely integrated with the internal learning effort (Marcelle 2004). Furthermore, to achieve utmost 
results of these integrative learning efforts the latecomer companies need to create a right balance 
between the different learning sources (ibid). In this sense, the ability for expeditious and integrative 
learning is a fundamental organisational capability, as it induces and shapes the dynamics underlying 
the development of technological capability. Learning concerns both technical and organisational 
aspects of upgrade. It involves a search, acquisition, absorption, re-combination and application of 
technical knowledge. Active acquisition of the latest technological information and knowledge and its 
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rapid diffusion and re-combination has been the driving force of the successful technological 
development in East Asia (Bell and Pavitt 1993; Ernst et al. 1998; Ernst and Kim 2002; Hobday 1995; 
2000; Kim 1997). Alongside acquisition of technical knowledge the learning efforts should also 
involve understanding and development of organisational arrangements to support the technological 
upgrade. For example, crisis construction has been actively used by successful latecomers to rapidly 
attain technological knowledge and also to re-engineer the existing business processes and develop new 
organisational arrangements (Kim 1997). This comes to reveal the critical importance of the 
expeditious and integrative learning effort for inducing the necessary dynamism for technological 
upgrade. 
The fourth organisational capability is the linkage capabilities, which are critical enablers for 
upgrade in latecomer companies. Establishing links and relationships with clients, suppliers and other 
parties have been identified as vital capabilities for latecomer companies, as these provide channels for 
obtaining information and feedback on technological dynamism (Bell and Pavitt 1993; Ernst et al. 
1998; Hobday 1995; Kim 1997). User-producer interactions have been outlined as one of the major 
drivers for generating innovation (von Hippel 1988), as the users possess an in-depth understanding 
about the work processes, the performance of the existing technologies and potential niches for further 
developments. Close interactions with clients can generate ideas for modification and improvement in 
the existing products and services. In the case of latecomers, interactions with clients are even more 
important, as the latecomers, being embedded in a latecomer context, have limited information about 
new developments and are away from lead users (Hobday 1995). Therefore, establishing and 
maintaining links and relationships with clients, foreign ones in particular, are important channels for 
obtaining information about new technological developments, feedback and identifying potential 
niches for further developments. Likewise, links with suppliers and other agents in the innovation 
networks (universities, research institutes, consultants, and so forth) contribute significantly to the 
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accumulation of information about new developments and the latecomer companies need to be able to 
tap also the potential of these sources of information. Partnerships with other companies or consultants 
have proved to be particularly influential for latecomer companies, as they also provide access to 
valuable pool of knowledge and resources and contacts.  
Apart from being valuable sources of knowledge and information, linkages are influential 
channel for finding contracts. It has been emphasised that the diaspora of Indians working in the US 
has appeared a critical driver in establishing contacts, getting contracts from the US companies and the 
subsequent boom in software development activities undertaken by Indian companies. Thus, 
latecomers should place deliberate efforts to establish links and contacts with foreign companies. 
Alongside development of the previous organisational capabilities, latecomer companies need 
to develop marketing capabilities, the fifth organisational capability. Latecomer software companies 
need to be capable of identifying potential clients, approaching them, promoting their in-house 
capabilities for software developments, and maintaining relationships with their clients upon 
completion of the project for further developments, and so forth. The abilities to market the in-house 
skills and expertise are crucial in ensuring the latecomers’ success. Only successful commercial 
application can harness already developed technical and organisational capabilities, and allow further 
expansion.  
Developing marketing capabilities is often difficult for any company, but it is very much the 
case with the latecomers. The latecomer companies may possess (sometimes very) limited knowledge 
about the structure and functioning of the international markets, which prevent them from being able to 
identify the right approach for entering a particular market, positioning themselves in the market and 
identifying the right customers. Further, even if successful in all of the above and having identified the 
right clients, the latecomers may fail in approaching and establishing contacts with them for a variety 
of reasons. In the domestic market, the latecomers have access to local customers with whom their 
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share the same cultural and business background, which makes establishment and maintaining contacts 
easier. This does not hold for the international customers, where the latecomers need to build 
relationship, taking into account international business ethics and management, and dealing with inter-
cultural differences such as different norms or even beliefs. Thus, developing skills in international 
business management becomes one of the prerequisites for latecomers’ success.   
The sixth and last of the critical organisational capabilities is strategic thinking. In their 
business activities the latecomer companies need to apply strategic vision of where the company is 
going in a longer term. The ability to think in a strategic way underpins latecomers’ success. Ernst 
(1998) identifies it as one of the five technological capabilities which latecomers need to develop. The 
managers need to have a clear vision what the company is aiming to accomplish in the future so they 
prepare and undertake the intermediate steps towards the final goal. In setting their goals the latecomer 
companies are to take into account their standing with respect to the development of the world industry. 
Questions like ‘where do the products and services offered by the company position with respect to 
development of the world industry’, ‘in what direction and how the company can upgrade’, and so 
forth, must be answered to achieve a sustainable position in the international market.   
It would be a mistake to assume that the latecomers should aim to position themselves as 
competing against the world players, as these may be quite unrealistic. As Arora and Gambardella’s 
(2005) study suggests the success in development of latecomer software industries lies in finding a 
niche in which the latecomers have a competitive advantage. To be able to identify an appropriate 
niche the latecomers have to have a deep understanding about the technological development of the 
world software industry and its trends, and the position, which the latecomers hold with respect to 
technological and organisational expertise and market strategy. Such assessment should adopt a 
dynamic perspective to re-assess changes over time. Once they have the vision set, the latecomers need 
to pursue their aim by undertaking the steps leading towards it. These would involve strategic actions 
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like establishing partnerships, building new expertise and expanding existing knowledge, and the like.  
 
4. Diverse learning paths pursued by latecomer companies in developing software activities  
High expectations have been raised about the benefits that the latecomers can reap by 
developing software industries. A number of latecomers have started developing software industries in 
the last decade. Despite the attention that has been given to the development of latecomer software 
activities in the academic and policy literature, an important question remains open. What are the 
possibilities before the latecomers in developing indigenous software industries: is there one ‘best’ path 
to develop software capabilities in the latecomers; are there many possible paths leading to the desired 
result and it is the analysis of the context that allows one to distinguish better from worse; or are there 
many paths – some lead upward and some lead off the cliff but all are obscured by clouds of 
uncertainty so one has to march forward with energy and enthusiasm and accept that one will either 
become God or a lemming.  
The last proposition seems to be less likely – certain instructions are available to the latecomers 
based on the understanding about the requirements for developing software industries (e.g. building 
skills base, expertise in software engineering, etc.) and also derived by the experience of others be they 
advanced-context companies or latecomers (e.g. different paths for software development activities, 
policy facilitation, etc.). Therefore, notwithstanding the uncertainties associated with every economic 
initiative, the development of latecomer software industries is not an undertaking driven by mere 
guesswork and clouded by absolutely uncertainty.  
The experience in development of latecomer software industries also reveals that the first 
proposition is also not viable: there is no one best path; different latecomers have embarked on 
different paths. Some latecomers have engaged actively in outsourcing for the international markets. 
Following the remarkable success of India, a number of latecomers have committed to outsourcing. 
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Another group of latecomers have directed their efforts towards providing customised services for the 
domestic markets. Few latecomers have focussed on developing software products for the domestic 
markets. China and Brazil are typical examples in that direction. Very few latecomers have targeted 
development of software products for the international markets and very few have succeeded.  
Apparently there are there many possible paths for development of latecomer software activities 
and it is the analysis of the context that allows one to distinguish better from worse. The core question 
is what level of technological sophistication these involve and whether the latecomer companies make 
deliberate effort to attain higher technological sophistication over time, i.e. to move upwards the 
software technological ladder. Therefore, the analyses of latecomer software development activities 
have to be directed at exploring the technological capabilities of the latecomers and their efforts to 
upgrade.  
There are a couple of important points to address in analysing outsourcing software industries. 
It can be expected that the latecomer companies which undertake outsourcing activities have developed 
capabilities in software programming, quality assurance and delivery on time, and possibly in software 
process control. However, there might be other capabilities that underpin the successful development of 
a software industry in a particular latecomer context and create a competitive advantage and these must 
be taken into account. For example, Athreye (2005) revealed that in the case of India it was the 
combination of both new business models and technical capabilities that created a strong competitive 
position for the Indian companies.  
There is one particularly important point with respect to outsourcing-driven software 
development activities. As already underlined, the outsourcing-driven software development activities 
may vary with respect to the degree of technological sophistication they involve. Some outsourcing 
projects may require only simple programming, while others may necessitate deployment of more 
sophisticated software programming capabilities and even customisation or localisation of existing 
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software products. Therefore, it is important for studies to scrutinise the degree of technological 
sophistication of the deployed capabilities and executed activities in the outsourcing-driven software 
development projects by the latecomer companies. 
The major challenge before software companies that undertake outsourcing activities is whether 
they will be able to sustain their business over time, if their advantage is only factor price-based. 
Therefore, studies need to assess the degree of technological sophistication of the outsourcing-driven 
software development activities undertaken by the latecomers and whether the latecomer companies 
have been able to deepen and broaden their capabilities, which may allow them to upgrade over time 
and avoid getting trapped in low and narrow capabilities trap. 
Few latecomer companies have managed to develop own software products and services and in 
most of the cases these are commercialised in the domestic market. The software development 
activities in Brazil and China are typical examples in that direction. As development of own products 
and services is associated with a wide range of capabilities, it can be assumed that the latecomer 
software companies that offer their own products and services have managed to develop a wider range 
of capabilities as compared to the outsourcing-driven firms. The question which arises is what kind of 
capabilities these companies have managed to muster and whether these will enable them to make a 
shift to the international markets at some point.  
A considerable number of latecomer software development activities involve customisation or 
localisation. As customisation is a process of tailoring a software product to specific customer needs, it 
may involve a wide range of activities from simple modifying to thorough redesign. Therefore, it 
involves a wide range of capabilities that go beyond programming, testing and process control and 
require capabilities for analysis of customer needs, re-design, possibly system analysis, etc. 
Customisation or localisation activities are carried out in almost every country, as there is a wide-
spread need for adaptation to local needs or local users’ requirements. Customisation or localisation 
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can involve localisation to local language (e.g. Chinese, Cyrilic, etc.) or specific local user 
requirements (e.g. adaptation of packaged software to the requirements of a particular customer). Often 
the localisation is undertaken by local software companies, which implies that a substantial part of the 
latecomer software development activities involve localisation and customisation and thus it is 
important for analyses to investigate the capabilities deployed. 
There are very few examples of indigenous latecomer software companies that have succeeded 
to enter the global software markets with their own products and these represent single exceptional 
cases. It has been already underlined above that the examples that have been cited in the existing 
literature represent advanced- rather than latecomer-context cases. In this sense, the literature so far has 
not identified cases of indigenous latecomer software companies that have introduced successfully own 
software products in the global markets. 
A recent research has detected that a limited number of Bulgarian software companies have 
been successful in launching their own products and services in the global markets and has emphasised 
that the software industry in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is entering a new phase, which has not 
been captured in previous studies (Rousseva 2008a). This is the first documented case in the literature 
of a small group of latecomer software companies that have successfully managed to develop own 
software products and enter the global markets.  
The main issue arising out of the above analysis is what kind of capabilities the latecomer 
companies have managed to muster and to what extent they have developed them, and how these relate 
to the ‘ideal’ model of capability development. The ‘ideal’ model of capability accumulation, which the 
latecomers need to reach in order to achieve the highest level of technological sophistication, requires 
that all capabilities are developed to a high extent (fig 1 in the Appendix). This ideal model can be used 
as a template for assessing the level of capability accumulation in companies. It is likely that 
companies will be able to develop easier basic capabilities (signifying low level of capability 
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development) and gradually will start to deepen and broaden their capabilities, to reach a state of 
medium capability development and eventually reach the high (ideal) capability accumulation (fig 1 in 
the Appendix). The different paths of software development activities discussed above may well lead to 
different patterns of capability accumulation both in terms of the range of capabilities which the 
latecomer companies develop and in terms of the depth of capability accumulation. Therefore, studies 
need to scrutinise the diverse paths of development of latecomer software industries and investigate 
differences in the patterns of capability accumulation and underlying learning trajectories.  
 
5. Conclusions and directions for further research 
This paper contributes to the existing body of literature by developing a ‘capabilities yardstick’ 
for assessing the technological capabilities in latecomer software companies. The proposed approach 
disentangles the specifics in analysing technological capability in latecomer software companies into an 
array of technical and organisational capabilities which the latecomer software companies need to 
muster to reach a high level of technological sophistication. This framework aims to capture as 
adequately as possible the capabilities, which the latecomer software companies need to muster to 
develop software technological capabilities taking into account both the specifics of the software 
industry and technological development in the latecomer context. The aim of the paper is to lay the 
foundations, outline the issues, draw the major capabilities and set the perspective in which to 
investigate them, and to provide a ground for empirical analyses, which may bring some additional 
issues. 
The main propositions advanced by this paper highlight that development of indigenous software 
industries is a daunting task for the latecomers, as developing technological capability requires 
development of a number of technical and organisational capabilities. This amplifies the need to 
scrutinise the capabilities, which the latecomer software companies have been able to develop in 
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executing their present software development activities and to analyse whether the latecomer software 
companies are managing to deepen their expertise and develop a wide array of capabilities, which 
would allow them to move upwards the ‘software development technological ladder’ and eventually 
launch their own products and services in the international markets at some point.  
By disentangling the complexity in development of latecomer software industries and the wide 
variety of technical and organisational capabilities required for accumulation of technological 
capability, the paper improves our understanding about the complexity in development of latecomer 
software industries and suggests that some of the existing academic and policy views need further 
elaboration if they are to be practically useful in supporting catching up activities. While discussing the 
possibilities for development of latecomer indigenous software industries, the studies need to take into 
account the wide array of technical and organisational capabilities, which the latecomer companies 
need to build, and the complexity of technological development in the latecomer context, and to assess 
the achievements and challenges in the capabilities building process. Public policies aiming to support 
development of latecomer indigenous software industries need to go beyond building infrastructures 
(telecommunication, technological infrastructure, education, and so forth), and should focus on 
capabilities building in the latecomer companies. They should facilitate, empower, or  stimulate the 
accumulation of technical capabilities but also (more so) organisational capabilities, as the latter are 
critical for harnessing the potential in the company and at the same time may be difficult to develop in 
the latecomer context.  
The proposed approach opens avenues for investigation of capabilities and for comparison 
between different levels and patterns in their accumulation. One direction of research is to analyse the 
accumulated technological capabilities in latecomer software industries, which follow different paths of 
development, as outlined in the previous section. For example, it would be appealing to explore the 
accumulation of capabilities in a latecomer software industry, which is actively involved in outsourcing 
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(like India, for example), and to compare these with the accumulation of capabilities in a latecomer 
software industry, which attempts to develop own software products and services (like Brazil, for 
example), and to investigate whether different patterns of accumulation of capabilities emerge. Another 
direction of research is to compare successful and less successful software companies in order to 
outline the capabilities that appear critical and those that appear difficult to develop in the process of 
capabilities accumulation. Another important direction of research has to be included in the framework 
and it concerns the learning activities in the companies. It is important for studies to scrutinise the 
learning activities contributing to accumulation of different technological capabilities in the companies.  
A last point related to this framework of technological capabilities in latecomer software 
companies concerns its variation and deviation from a framework for analysing innovation capabilities 
in advanced software companies. The proposed framework has been developed to reflect the specifics 
in development of latecomer software industries and thus it incorporates and emphasises features that 
are specific to the latecomer software industries. It disentangles the capabilities by deliberately 
reaching a high level of disaggregation in order to reveal a wide array of constituencies involved. It 
also explicitly focuses on basic capabilities, as the latecomers may face difficulties to develop even 
those.  
The approach scrutinises the technical capabilities and classifies them in three major groups 
starting from basic technical capabilities to reveal the sequential nature and the existence of thresholds 
in capability development. It is important to underline that the latecomer software companies may face 
difficulties in building even basic technical capabilities. The capability development task becomes even 
more daunting with respect to the advanced technical capabilities. The proposed approach has explored 
also organisational capabilities, as these are responsible for introducing the dynamics of technological 
learning and are thus critical for development of technological capability. In analysing the 
organisational capabilities the study has reached a high level of disaggregation and has focussed even 
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on general organisational capabilities alongside critical organisational capabilities underlying 
technological capability building, as all these may be difficult for latecomer companies to develop 
given their limited business experience. 
This research emphasises the critical importance of technological capabilities for shaping the 
development of latecomer software industries. However, it is also important to recognise the impact of 
other factors, like entry barriers for example, which affect directly the possibilities of latecomers to 
develop indigenous software industries. Alongside development of technological capabilities, some 
context-specific factors might exercise an impact in development of latecomer software industries and 
must be taken into account. For example, studies have recognised that some situational factors, like 
proficiency in English language and also the time zone have contributed significantly to the successful 
development of the India software industry. The role of situational factors should be definitely 
recognised in the analyses. This research explores the specifics and complexity of technological 
development in latecomer context and acknowledges the impact of the context-specific factors. 
Nevertheless, this study underlines the critical importance of the capability base in the country and the 
company-level efforts to upgrade. To illustrate this point one can compare the development of the 
software industry in Pakistan, a country which has similar advantages to India in terms of time zone 
and language proficiency but has reaped far moderate success in development of a software industry. 
The Indian success has been largely attributed to the availability of skilful human capital base, as all of 
the studies have outlined (Arora et al. 2001; Athreye 2005; Desai 2005; Tschang 2001) and the 
development of technical and organisational capabilities over time, as Athreye (2005) has revealed. 
The question, which remains open for studies to explore, is whether and to what extent the Indian 
companies will be able to make a shift to expand and deepen their capabilities in order to be able to 
develop own products and services and successfully launch them in the international markets on their 
own.
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 Appendix 
Table. 1. Classification of software development activities according to their technological 
sophistication 
 
Technological sophistication of software development activities  
Lower technological sophistication 
coding (writing new code based on existing designs or algorithms, 
modifying existing code, etc.) 
testing 
redesign (redesigning an existing software program) 
 
Higher technological sophistication 
initial software design (analysis of customer needs, requirements analysis, 
architecture, system analysis) 
market and feasibility analysis (including analysis of competitor capabilities) 
minor software process change (alterations in the work flow or division of 
labour involved in creating software) 
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Table 2. Capabilities underlying development of technological capability in latecomer software 
companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Technical capabilities 
Basic 
Capabilities for software programming 
Capabilities for testing and high quality assurance  
Intermediate 
Capabilities for project management 
Capabilities for software process management 
Capabilities in various operating environments (optional) 
Capabilities for network applications (optional) 
Advanced 
Capabilities for software design 
Capabilities to develop specialised expertise in a particular domain 
Capabilities to diversify the products and services offered (optional) 
Capabilities to monitor technological development and identify niches for 
potential developments 
 
 
Organisational capabilities underpinning the accumulation of 
technological capability 
Establishment of organisational culture facilitating learning 
Capabilities for effective management (e.g. communication, coordination, 
control, project management, prompt delivery, change management, 
human resource development) 
Capabilities for expeditious and integrative learning 
Linkage capabilities 
Marketing capabilities                                                                                     
Capabilities for strategic thinking 
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Different levels of capability accumulation 
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Fig. 1 Different levels of capability accumulation in latecomer companies 
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